Various rational and behavioral models have been proposed to explain contrarian portfolio returns. In this article, I test the gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein [Hong, H., & Stein J. C. (1999) . A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and overreaction in asset markets. Journal of Finance, 54, 2143Finance, 54, -2184. Specifically, I study contrarian strategies based on past long-term returns and fundamental value-to-price ratios. Using ex post returns as a proxy for expected returns and size-controlled analyst coverage as a proxy for the rate of information diffusion, I show that contrarian portfolio returns decline monotonically with increasing rates of information diffusion. These results are consistent with the predictions of the Hong and Stein model. In addition, I show that analyst coverage is more important among glamour than value stocks, supporting the view that investors are more prone to decision biases when it comes to pricing hard-to-value glamour stocks for which information is relatively more ambiguous.
Introduction
According to the gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) , momentum and reversal strategy returns should be more pronounced among stocks with low rates of information diffusion. Although evidence supporting the former prediction is provided in Hong, Terence, and Stein (2000) , the latter prediction has not been subjected to detailed investigation as of yet. The results presented in this article are indeed consistent with the view that fundamental reversal is stronger among stocks with low rates of information diffusion.
Specifically, I study contrarian strategies based on four different fundamental value indicators: past long-term returns, book-to-market equity ratio, cash flows-to-price ratio and earnings to-price ratio. The first contrarian strategy that I consider buys past losers and shorts past winners, whereas the last three buy stocks with high value-to-price ratios (value stocks) and sell those with low ratios (glamour stocks). Using ex post returns as a proxy for expected returns and size-controlled analyst coverage as a proxy for the rate of information diffusion, I show that contrarian portfolio returns decline monotonically with increasing rates of information diffusion. For example, the contrarian strategy based on book-to-market ratio among stocks with low analyst coverage generates a 1.06 percent monthly excess return, whereas the same contrarian strategy among stocks with high coverage yields only 0.25 percent. Moreover, this regularity cannot be explained by a rational approach. The same monotonic negative relationship between the rate of information diffusion and contrarian strategy returns is evident in risk-adjusted returns using a four-factor model which takes market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors into account.
Although the evidence is consistent with the gradual diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) , there may be an alternative explanation for the negative relationship between contrarian returns and the rate of information diffusion. Hirshleifer (2001) posits that any mispricing is likely to be most pronounced in firms with a high degree of information asymmetry and where rational arbitrage is less likely to be effective. In addition, trading volume may proxy for the rate of information flow (Copeland, 1976) which in turn implies a monotonic negative relationship between volume and contrarian returns. Furthermore, potential short sale restrictions may render forming contrarian strategies impossible. For example, stocks that I classify as having low rates of information diffusion may have higher transaction costs and lower trading volume, and the sort of strategies that I employ may work better when arbitrage is more costly. To examine whether the results presented in this article are robust, I redo the tests among low, average and high volume stock samples. Controlling for trading volume, contrarian strategies produce similar patterns across groups with varying degrees of information diffusion.
In addition to the evidence on contrarian portfolio returns, I also show an interesting asymmetry. The impact of gradual information diffusion is much more pronounced among glamour stocks than value stocks. There is virtually no significant cross-sectional return variation across different information diffusion groups among value stocks. On the contrary, among glamour stocks, those with low rates of information diffusion have returns that are significantly less than those with high rates of information diffusion. This pattern supports the view that investors are more prone to decision biases when it comes to pricing hard-to-value glamour stocks for which information is relatively more ambiguous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief background on the empirical regularities observed and possible explanations suggested. Section 2 explains the intuition behind the theoretical prediction I am testing and discusses alternative proxies for the rate of information diffusion. Section 4 describes the data sample and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 documents portfolio excess returns for contrarian strategies based on past long-term returns and on fundamental value-to-price ratios. Section 6 conducts some robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
Background
There are several empirical regularities in financial markets which traditional asset pricing models have failed to explain. For instance, stock returns exhibit return continuation at mediumterm (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993 , 2001 Rouwenhorst, 1998 Rouwenhorst, , 1999 . In contrast to medium-term continuation, there is fundamental reversal in the long run. In particular, De Thaler (1985, 1987) show that contrarian strategies which buy stocks with low past long-term returns and sell those with high returns earn abnormal profits over a holding period ranging from 3 to 5 years. 1 More recent studies analyzing contrarian strategies have focused on price-scaled variables such as the ratio of book value to market value of equity as relative fundamental value indicators. Stocks with high prices relative to fundamental values (glamour stocks) earn low risk-adjusted returns in the future and those with relatively low prices (value stocks) earn high returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; Haugen & Baker, 1996; Lakonishok, Shliefer, & Vishny, 1994; La Porta, 1996) .
According to the rational expectations theory, all return predictability must be due to exposure to economically meaningful risk factors. For example, Fama and French (1996) argue that past losers and value stocks tend to be distressed and that contrarian strategy returns can be explained by a three-factor model which takes financial distress risk into account. However, several papers demonstrate that long run contrarian strategies are not significantly riskier than average. 2 Additionally, there is disagreement over whether the Fama-French factors are economically meaningful risk factors. Specifically, Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that firm characteristics rather than factor loadings do a better job of predicting returns. Moreover, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) show that the book-to-market effect remains strong after controlling for financial distress and Piotroski (2000) shows that it is the financially healthy high book-to-market firms, rather than the distressed ones, that generate the value premium.
As an alternative, a number of behavioral models postulate that security prices are determined both by risk and expectational errors and set out to parsimoniously explain momentum and fundamental reversal. 3 In some of these models, security prices initially overreact to new information about fundamental firm value. For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) offer a model based on investor overconfidence and variations in confidence arising from biased selfattribution. In their model, prices initially overreact and then continue to overreact for a period of time creating momentum. The security prices finally revert back to their fundamental levels as more and more public information becomes available. In some other models such as in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , security prices initially underreact to information. Barberis et al. argue that conservatism coupled with representativeness bias can lead to underreaction over the medium-term and eventual reversal of prices.
Hypothesis development
It is possible to categorize behavioral models into two main groups: those in which overreaction causes the observed regularities and those in which underreaction is the culprit. The gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) falls into the latter category. However, the emphasis is on two groups of boundedly rational investors who observe different pieces of private information at different points in time. The interaction of these investors with one another, rather than cognitive biases, generates the empirical regularities observed in the data. The central assumption of the Hong and Stein model is that information diffuses gradually across investors and therefore gets only partially reflected in asset prices at any given time. This causes an initial underreaction in asset prices which eventually revert to fundamental levels.
The model assumes that there are two types of agents in the economy: newswatchers and momentum traders. Both types are boundedly rational in the sense that each type of agent is only able to process some subset of the publicly available information. Newswatchers make forecasts based on signals they observe about future fundamental values. However, they do not condition on current or past prices. Momentum traders, on the other hand, do condition on past prices, but they do not observe fundamental values. The central assumption of the Hong and Stein model is that private information diffuses only gradually among newswatchers, which creates underreaction in the medium-term. Momentum traders' attempts to profit from the underreaction caused by newswatchers create excessive momentum, which turn into an eventual overreaction. In short, both momentum and reversal patterns are consequences of the gradual diffusion of information combined with the failure of newswatchers to extract this information from prices.
The goal of this article is to test whether contrarian portfolio returns differ cross-sectionally across stocks with different rates of information diffusion. The speed with which information is incorporated into prices is determined in the equilibrium by aggregate resources spent on private information acquisition. Therefore, the basic task is to classify firms according to total equilibrium resources spent on private information acquisition. The first proxy I consider for such a task is firm size. Larger firms tend to attract more institutional investors, are more widely held and release more frequent public information. Small firms, on the other hand, are more likely to be closely held by insiders and tend to release less information. If there are fixed costs to information gathering, then it is likely that investors will spend more resources on larger firms in which they can take larger positions. In addition, Arbel (1985) and Hong et al. (2000) argue that the cost of obtaining information early is larger for smaller stocks. Overall, information is sparse and is expected to propagate slower among those that invest in small capitalization firms. If size can be considered as a proxy for the rate of information diffusion, then the gradual information diffusion model implies higher contrarian strategy returns among low capitalization stocks.
Even though firm size could be a useful proxy, it may be confounded by other factors such as risk. Inefficiencies and mispricing may be concentrated more in smaller stocks as arbitrage making capacity could be limited (Grossman and Miller, 1988; Merton, 1987) . Several studies suggest that as the number of informed investors increases, share prices will have a higher rate of information diffusion (e.g., Foster & Viswanathan, 1993; Holden & Subrahmanyam, 1992) . Since financial analysts collect and disseminate information about stocks, the number of analysts covering a firm is a natural proxy for the rate of information diffusion. It is reasonable to assume that more analysts following a stock will generate a higher volume of information which gets distributed among investors relatively faster. If this assumption holds, then the gradual information diffusion model predicts higher returns for contrarian portfolios formed among stocks with low analyst coverage than for those formed among high analyst coverage stocks. 4 Analyst services about a particular stock are determined by the demand for and supply of these services. There are several stock characteristics that have been shown to affect either the demand or the supply function of analyst services. Previous research (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 1998; Bhushan, 1989; Hong et al., 2000, among others) shows that firm size is a major determinant of such services. Larger firms are followed by more analysts, which results in greater private infor-mation acquisition about these firms. Besides size, characteristics such as ownership structure, total and systematic risk, turnover and book-to-market ratio are all shown to affect analyst coverage for a particular firm. However, any of these variables, while significant in isolation, adds very little explanatory power over and above that provided by size.
To distinguish between the gradual information diffusion effect and a pure size effect, I focus on size-controlled analyst coverage as a proxy for the rate of information diffusion. To the extent that size-controlled analyst coverage is a better proxy for information acquisition than size, it should allow for an unencumbered test.
Data sample
Firms are allocated to equally weighted portfolios either monthly or once a year in June, and the subsequent performance of these portfolios are tracked from July 1980 to December 2004 for holding periods ranging from 1 month to 3 years. Non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms, which are specified as ordinary common shares with monthly returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and with non-negative book values of equity available from COMPUSTAT, are included in this study. Stocks priced below US$ 5 on the portfolio formation date are excluded to ensure that the results are not driven by illiquid, low-priced stocks and bid-ask bounce. 5 Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) claim that there are severe measurement problems in raw and abnormal long-term buy and hold contrarian strategy returns due to microstructure induced biases stemming from investing in very low priced stocks. To reduce the impact of such biases on my results, I focus on relatively higher priced and liquid stocks.
Analyst coverage data are obtained from the I/B/E/S International Incorporated historical summary file. McNichols and O'Brien (1996) find that analysts are more likely to start covering firms when they are optimistic about their near-term prospects. Hong et al. (2000) suggest that this observation, coupled with Womack's (1996) evidence on stock price drift up to 6 months in response to analyst recommendations, raises the possibility that recent changes in analyst coverage may be informative about future returns. To avoid this possible endogeneity problem, Hong et al. recommend using "stale" data on analyst coverage. Therefore, for any given month, I set the analyst coverage for a firm equal to the average number of analysts providing fiscal year 1 earnings estimates over the prior 12 months. This process smoothes out transitory parts and gets the permanent component in analyst coverage data. If a stock satisfies CRSP selection criteria but is not listed on the I/B/E/S data file, analyst coverage is set equal to zero. 6 Following Lakonishok et al. (1994) , I use book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-toprice (EP) ratio and cash flows-to price (CP) ratio to classify firms into value versus glamour categories. The accounting data used to compute these fundamental value-to-price ratios are obtained from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT data base which is also maintained by CRSP. Similar to the definition in Fama and French (1996) , the book value of equity is defined as the book value of stockholder's equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use redemption, liquidation or par , all non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms which are specified as ordinary common shares in CRSP and with non-negative book values of equity in COMPUSTAT are allocated to decile portfolios based on their fundamental value-to-price ratios. Stocks priced below US$ 5 on the portfolio formation date are excluded. The equally weighted monthly returns in excess of the 1-month bill rate for these portfolios are calculated from July to next June (until December 2004 for June 2004 portfolio formation), resulting in a time series of 294 monthly returns. The averages of these excess returns and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in the panel. Deciles are formed annually based on book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-to-price (EP) ratio or cash flows-to price (CP) ratio. The accounting data used to compute these ratios are obtained from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT data base. Accounting values are for the end of the previous fiscal year and market values are for the end of the previous calendar year. The book value of equity is defined as the book value of stockholder's equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use redemption, liquidation or par value to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Earnings are measured before extraordinary items and cash flow is defined as earnings plus depreciation.
value to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Earnings are measured before extraordinary items, and cash flow is defined as earnings plus depreciation. Table 1 (Panel A) sets the stage by reporting average excess returns on 10 equally weighted portfolios formed monthly based on short-term (11-month) and long-term (48-month) past returns. I skip 11 months from 12 to 2 months prior to portfolio formation when calculating long-term past returns to weed out momentum effects. The portfolio formation month is also skipped before the test month to ensure that returns are not driven by bid-ask bounce. The results confirm the continuation of short-term returns in the period from July 1980 to December 2004 when portfolios are formed using returns from 12 to 2 months prior to portfolio formation. The average excess return in the month after portfolio formation ranges from 0.05 percent for the lowest short-term past return portfolio to 1.64 percent for the highest short-term past return portfolio. Panel A also shows that returns reverse when portfolios are formed using long-term returns from 60 to 13 months prior to portfolio formation. For these portfolios, the average excess return in the month after portfolio formation ranges from 1.14 percent for the lowest long-term past return portfolio to 0.44 percent for the highest long-term past return portfolio.
LSV analyze the returns on portfolios based on BM, CP and EP sorts. Panel B in Table 1 reports average monthly excess returns on such sorts. The firms are sorted into deciles every June from 1980 to 2004 based on their fundamental value-to-price ratios, and the equally weighted return on these portfolios are tracked for 1 year from July until next June. 7 Accounting values used in these ratios are for the end of the previous fiscal year, and market values are for the end of the previous calendar year. The results clearly show the value effect: there are strong positive relationships between average monthly excess returns and fundamental value-to-price ratios. For example, the average monthly excess return after portfolio formation ranges from −0.07 percent for the lowest BM portfolio to 1.12 percent for the highest BM portfolio.
Overall, it is clear that momentum, reversal and value regularities continue to hold over the 1980-2004 time period. 8 However, similar to the evidence presented in previous studies, contrarian strategy returns based on past long-term stock performance tend to be much smaller compared to the returns on either momentum or value strategies.
Before going forward to examine the impact of gradual dissemination of information on expected returns, Table 2 presents summary statistics of stock characteristics of interest. There are a total of 72,834 firms satisfying CRSP, COMPUSTAT and IBES data selection criteria. The number of firms used in portfolio formation ranges from a low of 2333 in 1990 to a high of 3922 in 1997. Even though IBES tends to cover larger firms, Panel A shows that there is a big variation in firm size in the data sample-market value ranges from US$ 0.5 million to US$ 602 billion. The average market value of a firm in this study is roughly US$ 1.5 billion. However, this variable is highly skewed. Analyst coverage also varies widely, ranging from no coverage at all to a maximum of 48 analysts following a firm. Finally, Panel B gives the correlation structure between analyst coverage, firm size and value-to-price ratios. The lower triangle of the correlation matrix gives Spearman rank correlations, and the upper triangle gives partial Spearman rank correlations controlling for firm size. The correlation coefficients are calculated every year from 1980 to 2004, and the average values are reported in Panel B. The average correlation coefficient between analyst coverage and firm size is 0.812. Book-to-market ratio, cash flows-to-price ratio and earnings-to-price ratio are all positively correlated with each other, confirming the notion that these three ratios proxy for the same phenomenon. The upper triangle of the correlation matrix shows that, once size is accounted for, there is almost no discernable pattern between analyst coverage and value-to-price ratios. Overall, the results in Panel B confirm the earlier studies that firm size is a major determinant of analyst coverage. At the end of June of each year , I calculate stock characteristics for all non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms which are specified as ordinary common shares in CRSP, with stock prices above US$ 5 and with non-negative book values of equity in COMPUSTAT. Size is calculated as the end of June market capitalization in millions of dollars. Book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-to-price (EP) ratio and cash flows-to price (CP) ratio are obtained from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT data base. Accounting values are for the end of the previous fiscal year and market values are for the end of the previous calendar year. The book value of equity is defined as the book value of stockholder's equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use redemption, liquidation or par value to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Earnings are measured before extraordinary items and cash flow is defined as earnings plus depreciation. Coverage is defined as the average number of analysts providing fiscal year 1 earnings estimates over the prior 12 months and obtained from the IBES International Incorporated historical summary file. If a stock satisfies CRSP and COMPUSTAT selection criteria but is not listed on the IBES data file, analyst coverage is set equal to zero. There are a total of 72,834 firms over 25 years in the final data sample satisfying CRSP, COMPUSTAT and IBES data selection criteria. The number of firms ranges from a low of 2333 in 1990 to a high of 3922 in 1997.
Panel A provides the sample mean, standard deviation, median, inter-quartile range and minimum and maximum levels of stock characteristics. Panel B provides the correlation structure between analyst coverage, firm size and value-to-price ratios. The lower triangle of the correlation matrix gives Spearman rank correlations, and the upper triangle gives partial Spearman rank correlations adjusted for firm size. The correlation coefficients are calculated every year, and the time series averages of these are reported in the panel.
Empirical methodology and results
In this section, I form portfolios based on size-controlled analyst coverage and fundamental value indicators, and examine the impact of gradual dissemination of information on expected returns. To distinguish between the gradual information diffusion effect and a pure size effect, I first assign stocks into five analyst coverage groups using size-dependent ranks (e.g., Brennan, Jegadeesh, & Swaminathan, 1993) . Every month in the sample, stocks with available CRSP data but missing analyst coverage data (stocks that are coded as having zero coverage in this article) are placed into the Low analyst coverage group. The remainder of the stocks are first placed into 20 size groups, and then within each size group placed into four groups based on analyst coverage cutoff points. In this way, I end up with five size-controlled analyst coverage groups.
There are potential measurement error biases present in the Low analyst coverage portfolio returns since some stocks may be mistakenly classified as having zero analyst coverage. However, such biases should make my tests err on the side of conservatism as it should be harder to discern differences across different coverage groups. In addition, the comparison between portfolio returns among the second lowest coverage group and the highest is free of such measurement error biases.
Contrarian strategies based on past long-term returns
The first set of empirical tests examines the cross-sectional return variation in contrarian portfolios based on past long-term returns. Five equally weighted portfolios are formed monthly based on long-term (48-month) past returns from 60 to 13 months prior to portfolio formation within each of the five size-controlled analyst coverage groups. For example, firms are allocated to performance quintiles for July 1980 (the first test month) based on their compounded returns from July 1975 through June 1979. Months from July 1979 through May 1980 are skipped to weed out momentum effects, and June 1980 is skipped to ensure that the monthly returns in July 1980 are not due to potential bid-ask bounce. The relative contrarian portfolio is then formed by buying stocks in the worst performing 20 percent of the respective analyst coverage group and shorting those in the best performing 20 percent. Table 3 outlines monthly average excess returns on 25 analyst coverage and past return sorted portfolios over the full sample period and over two sub-samples. The last row (LmH) of Panel A shows that, over the full sample of 294 test months, the average contrarian portfolio monthly return declines from 0.65 to 0.37 percent as analyst coverage increases. Panels B and C report a similar weak negative relationship between contrarian portfolio returns and analyst coverage over the two sub-sample periods. However, the results are stronger over the latter part of the sample period as documented in Panel C.
The results in Table 3 weakly support the gradual information diffusion hypothesis: contrarian portfolio returns tend to be higher among stocks with a lower rate of information diffusion. However, the evidence is quite weak compared to that provided in Hong et al. (2000) on momentum returns. This should come as no surprise since there is generally not much variation in contrarian portfolio returns to work with. To have a stronger test, I need a contrarian portfolio strategy that provides a wider distribution of returns. In the next section, I use an alternative method to form contrarian portfolios based on relative fundamental value-to-price ratios, and further analyze the relationship between contrarian strategy returns and the rate of information diffusion.
Contrarian strategies based on value-to-price ratios
Previous research has shown that value strategies which invest in stocks with low prices relative to fundamental values provide higher yields. 9 Some researchers associate these higher yields with changes in risk and argue that the extra premium is simply compensation for extra risk. For example, Fama and French (1993, 1995) argue that high book-to-market firms earn higher future returns because they are distressed, and thus receive a distress premium. Others put forth an alternative interpretation, arguing that value-to-price ratios capture errors in the way investors form expectations about security prices. Lakonishok et al. (1994) claim that the reason why value strategies provide higher returns is because they are contrary to the strategies followed by typical investors who extrapolate past performance too far into the future. Along these lines, La Porta At the beginning of each month t (July 1980 to December 2004), all non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms which are specified as ordinary common shares and with returns for months t-60 to t in CRSP are allocated to 25 portfolios based on their ranked values of analyst coverage and past long-term returns. Stocks priced below US$ 5 on the portfolio formation date are excluded. For each month, analyst coverage for a firm is defined as the average number of analysts providing fiscal year 1 earnings estimates over the prior 12 months and is obtained from the IBES International Incorporated historical summary file. If a stock satisfies CRSP selection criteria but is not listed on the IBES data file, analyst coverage is set equal to zero. Size is defined as the beginning of month market capitalization in millions of dollars. Every month, stocks with zero analyst coverage are placed into the Low analyst coverage group. The remainder of the stocks are first placed into 20 size groups, and then within each size group placed into four groups based on analyst coverage cutoff points. This process results in five size-controlled analyst coverage groups. Next, the stocks within each size-controlled analyst coverage group are divided into quintiles based on long-term returns from 60 to 13 months prior to portfolio formation. 1996) shows that contrarian strategies which seek to exploit errors in analysts' forecasts earn superior returns because expectations about earnings growth tend to be too extreme. The goal in this section is to analyze the performance of contrarian strategies based on valueto-price ratios across groups with different rates of information diffusion. If the predictions of Hong and Stein (1999) model hold, I should see higher contrarian returns among stocks with a lower rate of information diffusion.
The strategies that I consider invest in value stocks and finance the purchase by selling glamour stocks. Following LSV, glamour stocks are defined as those which have performed well in the past, or those that are expected to perform well in the future. Value stocks are defined in the same way as stocks with poor performance. I use BM ratio to quantify fundamental past performance. Proxies for expected future performance are inferred from CP or EP ratios. The tool I use for this indirect calculation is Gordon's dividend growth formula, which states that P = D/(r − g), where P is the current stock price, D the next period's dividend payment, r the discount rate on the stock and g is the expected growth rate of dividends. Using a similar formula for cash flows and earnings and assuming that a constant fraction of these are paid out as dividends, one can indirectly calculate the expected growth rate in cash flows or earnings inherent in security prices. Although this analogy is overly simplified, it is possible to assert that CP (EP) ratio is a proxy for the difference in expected growth rates of cash flows (earnings).
Firms are sorted into quintiles annually every June from 1980 to 2004 based either on past performance utilizing ranked values of BM, or based on expected future growth employing CP or EP ratios within each of the five size-controlled analyst coverage groups. For each analyst coverage group, the glamour portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 20 percentile of a given valuation ratio. Similarly, the value portfolio contains stocks in the highest 20 percentile. Contrarian portfolios are defined as differences of value and glamour portfolios. The portfolio returns are tracked for 1 year from July to next June. Table 4 outlines simple characteristics of the 25 analyst coverage and value-to-price sorted portfolios. The numbers reported are time series averages of cross-sectional medians of stocks within each cell. Take BM based sorts in Panel A as an example. Analyst coverage is zero in the low coverage column by design, and has a fairly stable distribution across different BM groups within each coverage column. For any column in the panel, the glamour firms are on average larger than the value firms as the intuition would suggest. With the exception of the low (zero) coverage column, size is fairly stable across coverage groups within each BM quintile (row) as well. BM ratio is monotonically increasing from glamour to value quintiles within each coverage column, and is fairly stable within rows. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Panels B and C. Table 5 reports average monthly excess returns for 25 size-controlled analyst coverage and value-to-price ratio portfolios. The returns presented are averages over all 1-year test periods, and t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation. Panel A provides portfolio returns based on BM sorts. As the results show, average excess returns are much smaller for glamour (low BM) than value (high BM) portfolios among low analyst coverage stocks, but this pattern weakens among high analyst coverage stocks. A contrarian trading strategy based on book-to-market ratio with a short position in glamour stocks and a long position in value stocks (row labeled "HmL") generates a 1.79 percent (t = 3.95) return among zero coverage stocks, but yields only 0.25 percent (t = 1.00) among high coverage stocks. Consistent with the gradual information diffusion hypothesis, contrarian strategy returns steadily decline as we move on to groups with higher analyst coverage. The return differential between the contrarian portfolio among low coverage stocks (HmL in column 2) and At the end of June of each year , all non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms which are specified as ordinary common shares in CRSP, with stock prices above US$ 5, with non-negative book values of equity in COMPUSTAT and with analyst coverage data from IBES are allocated to 25 portfolios based on their ranked values of size-controlled analyst coverage and based either on book-to-market value of equity (BM), on earnings-to-price (EP) ratio or on cash flows-to price (CP) ratio. To be included in the analysis for a given year, a firm must have data on all of the portfolio formation variables. The sample of firms is thus the same in each panel. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . Panels A-C report average number of analysts, size (market capitalization) and value to price ratios for portfolios based on book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-to-price (EP) ratio and cash flowsto price (CP) ratio sorts, respectively. The median values of parameters of interest are calculated every year for each portfolio, and the time series averages of these medians are reported in the table. At the end of June of each year , all non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed U.S. firms which are specified as ordinary common shares in CRSP, with stock prices above US$ 5, with non-negative book values of equity in COMPUSTAT and with analyst coverage data from IBES are allocated to 25 portfolios based on their ranked values of size-controlled analyst coverage and based either on book-to-market value of equity (BM), on earnings-to-price (EP) ratio or on cash flows-to price (CP) ratio. The equally weighted monthly returns in excess of the 1-month bill rate for these portfolios are calculated from July to next June (until December 2004 for June 2004 portfolio formation), resulting in a time series of 294 monthly returns. To be included for the tests in a given year, a firm must have data on all of the portfolio formation variables. The sample of firms is thus the same in each panel. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . Relative contrarian portfolios (HmL) are formed as differences of value (high value-to-price ratio) and glamour (low value-to-price ratio) portfolios within each coverage group. The analyst spread portfolios (H-L and H-2) are formed as differences of high analyst coverage and low analyst coverage portfolios within each valuation group. Panel A shows average monthly portfolio excess returns and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics for portfolios based on BM sorts. Panels B and C show averages for CP and EP based sorts, respectively. the one among high coverage stocks (HmL in column High) is −0.81 percent (t = −4.75) for BM based sorts. If I were to look at the return difference between the contrarian portfolio among zero analyst coverage stocks and the one among high coverage stocks, the difference increases to −1.54 percent per month. Similar conclusions follow from Panels B and C which use CP and EP based sorts. To the extent that the size-controlled analyst coverage is a good proxy for the rate of information diffusion, the results reported in this section overwhelmingly support the prediction of Hong and Stein (1999) model that contrarian returns should decline with the rate of information diffusion. These results are also consistent with Griffin and Lemmon (2002) who show that the book-tomarket effect is largest in small firms with low analyst coverage. Specifically, they show that small firms with low analyst coverage exhibit a return difference between high and low BM firms of 16.49 percent per year, as compared to negative 2.64 percent per year for large firms with high analyst coverage. Griffin and Lemmon conclude that the evidence they provide suggests that investors may underestimate the importance of information about current fundamentals and overestimate the payoff from future growth opportunities.
Average monthly excess returns

When is the rate of information diffusion more important?
The results so far support the view that expectational errors may play a role in the way investors set security prices. Whatever phenomena are driving these biases, it is more likely that they have a bigger impact on securities for which information is sparse. For example, Hirshleifer (2001) postulates that greater uncertainty about a stock and a lack of accurate feedback about fundamentals leave more room for valuation biases. Daniel and Titman (1999) suggest that investors are more likely to make judgment errors when they are analyzing difficult to value stocks such as those with high growth potential.
The degree of subjectivity in security valuation, and consequently, the degree of mispricing should vary cross-sectionally across stocks with different amounts of ambiguous information. Financial analysts are in the business of uncovering potentially useful information and disseminating it to the investing public through stock recommendations and research reports. Thus, it is plausible to assume that analyst coverage and the speed with which private information diffuses among investors is related to the level of ambiguous information. The fraction of ambiguous information should decline as more and more analysts begin covering a stock and help disseminate information faster.
The level of ambiguous information also depends on stock characteristics. For example, a relatively mature firm with little growth opportunities should be easier to value than a firm with high growth potential and highly uncertain future cash flows. Along the same lines, it should be easier to price a value stock than a glamour stock with high expected growth rate. Glamour stocks contain more ambiguous information and are presumably harder to price than value stocks. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect relatively more pricing errors in glamour stocks a priori. Analyst coverage may actually reduce the fraction of ambiguous information and help reduce pricing errors. If the fraction of ambiguous information is proportionally greater in glamour stocks, then analyst coverage should have the biggest impact on such stocks.
The results reported in Table 5 support the view that analyst coverage is indeed more important among glamour stocks than value stocks. There is almost no variation in returns across different coverage groups among value stocks. In comparison, there is a large variation across coverage groups among glamour stocks. An analyst spread strategy with a long position in the value portfolio among high coverage stocks and a short position in the value portfolio among the second lowest coverage stocks (column H-2 in High row) yields anywhere from 0.03 to 0.07 percent per month depending on the valuation ratio used, all of which are statistically insignificant. In contrast, the (H-2) analyst spread strategy among glamour stocks (column H-2 in Low row) yields on average 0.84 percent (t = 4.64), 0.87 percent (t = 4.53) and 0.72 percent (t = 4.30) per month based on BM, CP and EP based sorts, respectively. The return spread gets even larger if I were to analyze analyst spread strategies formed among the lowest (zero) coverage and highest coverage groups (column H-L). Fama and French (1996) argue that a three-factor model which incorporates size (SMB), value (HmL) and a market (MKT) factor can explain all pricing anomalies with the exception of momentum returns. This raises the possibility that the negative relationship between contrarian portfolio returns and analyst coverage I have documented earlier might simply be due to exposure to risk. After all, the contrarian strategy HmL is formed by buying value stocks and shorting glamour stocks; which would imply a significant positive exposure to the value factor. Additionally, the summary statistics in Table 4 suggest that such a portfolio might carry characteristics of a relatively small firm.
Risk-adjusted contrarian strategy (HmL) portfolio returns
To corroborate, I examine in this section, whether the contrarian portfolio returns can indeed be explained by a risk-based model. Since the Fama-French three-factor model does not capture the momentum effect, I use a four-factor model to adjust for risk instead. Specifically, I run the following time series regression using monthly portfolio returns for 25 size-controlled analyst coverage and value-to-price ratio portfolios, and the resulting contrarian portfolios over the full sample of 294 months from July 1980 to December 2004:
where R it − R ft is the return of portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, MKT t the excess return of the market portfolio, SMB t the size factor which is the return differential between portfolios of small and large stocks, HmL t the value factor and equals the return differential between portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios and UMD t is the momentum factor which is the return difference between portfolios of past winners and losers. The intercepts from these regressions can be interpreted as abnormal portfolio returns relative to the four-factor model.
To reduce clutter, Table 6 reports the four-factor model regression results just for the five contrarian strategy portfolios (as differences) since the main focus of this article is to expose the relationship between contrarian strategy returns and the gradual diffusion of information. 10 The first row of each panel in Table 6 repeats the average monthly returns and t-statistics of Table 5 for ease of disposition. The results suggest that the risk-adjusted returns echo the pattern in average monthly returns: there is a monotonic negative relationship between abnormal returns and analyst coverage. For example, Panel A shows that the contrarian portfolio formed among Low (zero) analyst coverage stocks by buying stocks with high BM ratios and shorting stocks with low BM ratios generates a 1.47 percent (t = 5.43) monthly abnormal return after controlling for market, size, value and momentum risk factors. Even if I were to dismiss this high abnormal return on Low (zero) analyst coverage group due to potential measurement errors, the abnormal return on the contrarian portfolio formed among the second lowest coverage group is still a The formation of contrarian portfolios (HmL) based on book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-to-price (EP) ratio and cash flows-to price (CP) ratio among different analyst coverage groups is described in Table 5 . Columns H-L and H-2 give the differences between contrarian portfolios among high analyst coverage and low analyst coverage groups. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . To obtain the four-factor model results the following regression model is estimated using monthly returns for 25 size-controlled analyst coverage and value-to-price portfolios:
where R it − R ft is the return of portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, MKT t the excess return of the market portfolio, SMB t the size factor which is the return differential between portfolios of small and large stocks, HmL t the book-to-market factor and equals the return differential between portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios and UMD t is the momentum factor which is the return difference between portfolios of past winners and losers. The intercepts from these regressions can be interpreted as abnormal portfolio returns relative to the four-factor model. Only the results on contrarian (HmL) portfolios (as differences) are reported in this table. Panel A shows average monthly portfolio returns, four-factor model regression results and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics for portfolios based on BM sorts. Panels B and C show the corresponding values for CP and EP based sorts, respectively. significant 0.37 percent (t = 2.13). On the other hand, the contrarian portfolio formed among high analyst coverage stocks generates a negative 0.32 percent (t = −2.35) monthly abnormal return. The difference between contrarian portfolio abnormal returns formed among the second lowest coverage group and that formed among the highest coverage group (column H-2) is negative 0.69 percent (t = −4.05). The same conclusions follow from the contrarian portfolios based on CP and EP sorts in Panels B and C, respectively. Table 6 also shows that contrarian portfolios load significantly positively on the value factor as expected. The factor sensitivities on the other three risk factors do not follow a strict pattern across analyst coverage groups. The adjusted R 2 is well above 50 percent for these portfolios, suggesting that the four-factor model has a significant explanatory power for contrarian portfolios based on price-scaled valuation ratios.
The results reported in this subsection are robust to the time period used. Similar conclusions emerge when I repeat the tests over two sub-periods: from July 1980 to December 1993, and from January 1994 to December 2004. These results are available upon request and omitted here to conserve space.
Risk-adjusted analyst spread (H-2) portfolio returns
I showed earlier that the impact of gradual information diffusion is much more pronounced among glamour than value stocks. For example, there is almost no cross-sectional return variation across analyst coverage groups among value stocks in Table 5 . On the contrary, among glamour stocks, those with low analyst coverage have returns that are significantly less than those with high coverage. Table 5 shows that analyst spread portfolio returns (columns H-L and H-2) progressively get smaller as I move from glamour to value stocks. It seems that investors are more prone to decision biases when it comes to pricing hard-to-value glamour stocks. Additionally, this conclusion is unlikely to be driven by risk factors as analyst spread portfolios are roughly size and value neutral which is evident in summary statistics reported in Table 4 .
To provide further evidence, Table 7 reports the four-factor model intercepts as well as the factor loadings for the analyst spread portfolios formed among the second lowest coverage and highest coverage groups (H-2). The first column of each panel in Table 7 repeats the average monthly returns and t-statistics of Table 5 to make an easier comparison between average and abnormal returns. Remember that there are potential measurement error biases present in the Low (zero) analyst coverage portfolio returns since some stocks may be mistakenly classified as having zero analyst coverage. However, the comparison between portfolio returns among the second lowest coverage group and the highest is free of such measurement error biases. Even though such biases should work against my tests, I only report the more conservative case in Table 7 and skip the results on analyst spread strategies formed among the low (zero) coverage and high coverage groups (H-L).
Panel A in Table 7 shows that both average monthly returns and abnormal returns decline monotonically as I move from low BM stocks to high BM ones. The analyst spread portfolio formed among low BM stocks generates a 0.58 percent (t = 2.73) monthly abnormal return, whereas the one formed among high BM stocks yields a negative 0.11 percent (t = −0.72). The difference between the two is a significant negative 0.69 percent (t = −4.05). The same conclusions follow from the CP and EP based sorts in Panels B and C, respectively.
As Table 7 shows almost all of analyst spread portfolios have non-zero sensitivities to the risk factors. A priori, one would expect these portfolios to have zero exposure to the size and value risk factors. However, the factor sensitivities, even though small in magnitude, are statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the adjusted R 2 is roughly around 10 percent, The formation of analyst spread portfolios among different values of book-to-market value of equity (BM), earnings-toprice (EP) ratio and cash flows-to price (CP) ratio is described in Table 5 . Row (HmL) gives the difference between analyst spread portfolios among high and low fundamental value ratios. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . To obtain the four-factor model results the following regression model is estimated using monthly returns for 25 sizecontrolled analyst coverage and value-to-price portfolios:
where R it − R ft is the return of portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, MKT t the excess return of the market portfolio, SMB t the size factor which is the return differential between portfolios of small and large stocks, HmL t the book-to-market factor and equals the return differential between portfolios of stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios and UMD t is the momentum factor which is the return difference between portfolios of past winners and losers. The intercepts from these regressions can be interpreted as abnormal portfolio returns relative to the four-factor model. Only the results on (H-2) analyst spread portfolios (as differences) are reported in this table. Panel A shows average monthly portfolio returns, four-factor model regression results and autocorrelation adjusted tstatistics for portfolios based on BM ratio. Panels B and C show the corresponding values for CP and EP based ratios, respectively.
suggesting that the four-factor model has not much explanatory power over the analyst spread strategies.
The results reported in this subsection also are robust to the time period used. Similar conclusions follow when I repeat the tests over two sub-periods from July 1980 to December 1993, and from January 1994 to December 2004.
Robustness checks
Long-term buy-and-hold returns
The behavioral models designed to explain continuation and momentum anomalies are silent on the holding period for expected returns. A part of the anomalies literature argues that the long-term investor experience is better captured by compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term buy-and-hold returns. However, a criticism brought to this approach by Fama (1998) is that compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term returns is problematic. He emphasizes that all models for expected returns are incomplete descriptions of the systematic patterns in average returns during any sample period. As a result, tests of efficiency are always contaminated by a bad-model problem. He goes on to argue that the bad-model problem grows with the return horizon. Both theoretical and statistical considerations alike suggest that formal inferences about long-term returns should be based on averages or sums of short-term abnormal returns rather than the buy-and-hold long-term abnormal returns.
Notwithstanding the discussion above, this subsection departs from the average monthly analysis of previous sections and analyzes long-term buy-and-hold portfolio returns. The portfolio formation is similar to that in Table 5 ; i.e., 25 portfolios are formed annually at the end of every June based on analyst coverage and fundamental value to price ratios. Cumulative monthly excess returns of the resulting contrarian portfolios (HmL) and analyst spread portfolios (H-2) are tracked up to 36 months in event time. 11 Fig. 1 plots contrarian strategy (HmL) cumulative excess returns formed among five analyst coverage groups. Based on any of the three value-to-price ratios, the strategy especially among lower analyst coverage stocks continues to bring excess returns up to 24 months after portfolio formation, and then levels off somewhat. For example, the cumulative excess return on the contrarian strategy based on BM ratio among the 2nd lowest analyst coverage group is 13.49 percent after the first year, grows to a little over 25 percent by the second year, and reaches almost 29 percent by the end of the third year after portfolio formation. On the other hand, the growth in the cumulative excess return on the contrarian strategy based on BM ratio among high analyst coverage stocks is much smaller. Nevertheless, any length of holding period up to 3 years or less supports the view that a contrarian strategy formed among stocks with low information diffusion brings higher returns than a similar strategy formed among stocks with high information diffusion.
It is clear in Fig. 1 that there is a pronounced January effect in contrarian portfolio cumulative excess returns. As we have observed in Table 4 , such a portfolio has the general characteristics of a small firm. The effect is rather large for the contrarian portfolio formed among the Low (zero) analyst coverage group which mainly contains small firms. The cumulative excess return on the contrarian strategy based on BM ratio among the Low (zero) analyst coverage group drops from 10.37 percent to almost 9 percent on the first January after portfolio formation. The January effect deepens as the holding period increases supporting the view of Fama (1998) that bad-model problem compounds with the return horizon. The drop in the cumulative return is from 37 to 32 percent on the second January, and from roughly 57 to 49 percent on the third January after portfolio formation. The January effect subsides somewhat as we move from contrarian strategies among low to high coverage stocks. , firms are allocated to 25 portfolios based on ranked values of size-controlled analyst coverage and based either on book-to-market value of equity (BM), on earnings-to-price (EP) ratio or on cash flows-to price (CP) ratio. The equally weighted monthly returns in excess of the 1-month bill rate for these portfolios are tracked up to 3 years after portfolio formation. Relative contrarian portfolios (HmL) are formed as differences of value (high value-to-price ratio) and glamour (low value-to-price ratio) portfolios within each coverage group. Finally, contrarian portfolio (HmL) compounded returns in event time are plotted here. Subscripts (low, 2, 3, 4, high) refer to contrarian portfolios formed among different analyst coverage groups. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . The details of security selection and portfolio formation are explained in Table 5 . Fig. 2 is a plot of the analyst spread strategy (H-2) cumulative excess returns formed among different levels of fundamental value to price ratios. Taking BM based sorts as an example, it is clear that analyst coverage plays a more central role among glamour (low BM) than value (high BM) stocks. There is a monotonic negative relationship between long-term buy-and-hold analyst spread portfolio returns and the BM ratio. For example, the cumulative return on the analyst spread strategy formed among glamour stocks is 10.53 percent after the first year, grows to 18.72 percent by the second year, and then plateaus till the end of the third year after portfolio formation. On the other hand, there is no growth in the cumulative excess return on the analyst spread strategy formed among value stocks. Fig. 2 suggests that research analysts might serve a more critical role in reducing information disparity among glamour stocks. In contrast to Fig. 1 , there is no January effect observed in cumulative excess returns in Fig. 2 . This again should come as no surprise since analyst spread portfolios are nearly size and value neutral as observed earlier in Table 4 .
Trading volume, information flow and price formation
The evidence documented so far on the negative relationship between contrarian returns and analyst coverage is consistent with the implications of the gradual diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) . However, there may be alternative explanations for the phenomena. For example, , firms are allocated to 25 portfolios based on ranked values of size-controlled analyst coverage and based either on book-to-market value of equity (BM), on earnings-to-price (EP) ratio or on cash flows-to price (CP) ratio. The equally weighted monthly returns in excess of the 1-month bill rate for these portfolios are tracked up to 3 years after portfolio formation. The analyst spread portfolios (H-2) are formed as differences of high analyst coverage and low analyst coverage portfolios within each valuation group. Finally, analyst spread portfolio (H-2) compounded returns in event time are plotted here. Subscripts (low, 2, 3, 4, high) refer to analyst spread portfolios formed among different fundamental value to price groups. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . The details of security selection and portfolio formation are explained in Table 5 . Hirshleifer (2001) posits that any mispricing is likely to be most pronounced in firms with a high degree of information asymmetry and where rational arbitrage is less likely to be effective. Additionally, trading volume may proxy for the rate of information flow (Copeland, 1976) which in turn implies a monotonic negative relationship between volume and contrarian returns. Furthermore, potential short sale restrictions may render forming contrarian strategies impossible. Firms that I classify as having low rates of information diffusion may have higher transaction costs and lower trading volume, and the sort of strategies that I employ may work better when arbitrage is more costly.
It has been shown in prior studies that there is a positive correlation between analyst coverage and turnover. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) suggest that high coverage stocks have lower adverse selection costs of trading and hence attract more volume. If this is true, then turnover would just be a noisy proxy for analyst coverage. Therefore, it should not be used as a control variable since this would reduce exogenous variation in coverage. However, it may be possible that both analyst coverage as well as transaction costs of arbitrage are driven primarily by float rather than market capitalization. In this setting, a turnover control which would proxy for float would be warranted. Even though a detailed evaluation of the information content of the trading process and the impact of it on trading volume and serial correlation in stock returns is beyond Table 8 Average monthly returns and four-factor model based abnormal returns (in percent) for five contrarian (HmL) portfolios formed annually based on analyst coverage and valuation ratios: turnover sub-samples At the end of June of each year , firms are first allocated into low, average and high turnover sub-samples based on 30th and 70th percentile cutoff points. The empirical analysis of Table 6 is then repeated in each sub-sample. The turnover for a stock is defined as the average trading volume over the prior 12 months as a fraction of the total shares outstanding. Size, analyst coverage, BM, EP and CP are defined in Table 2 . The way size-controlled analyst coverage groups are formed is discussed in Table 3 . Panel A shows average monthly returns and the four-factor model abnormal returns for contrarian (HmL) portfolios among the low trading volume sub-sample. Panels B and C show the results among average and high turnover subsamples, respectively. the scope of this paper, trading volume is an important variable in the type of empirical analysis I am performing.
To examine whether the evidence on the negative relationship between contrarian strategy returns and analyst coverage is robust to different specifications, I replicate the tests in three sub-samples of the data based on turnover. The monthly turnover for a stock is defined as the average trading volume over the prior 12 months as a fraction of the total shares outstanding. 12 The averaging is used to prevent potential seasonal variations in turnover. On every June, firms are first allocated into low, average and high turnover sub-samples based on 30th and 70th percentile cutoff points. The empirical analyses of the previous sections are then repeated in each sub-sample. Table 8 reports the average monthly returns and the four-factor model based abnormal returns for the five contrarian strategy portfolios (HmL) based on BM, CP and EP sorts in each of the three turnover sub-samples. The results show that contrarian strategies produce similar patterns across groups with varying degrees of information diffusion within these sub-samples. For instance, in the low turnover sample in Panel A, the contrarian portfolio returns decrease as analyst coverage increases. The same almost monotonic negative relationship is observed both in average monthly returns and abnormal returns in BM, CP or EP based contrarian portfolios. The same conclusions follow from the results on average and high volume samples in Panels B and C, respectively.
Conclusions
In this article, I examine the effect of gradual information diffusion on contrarian strategy returns. The strategies are based on four fundamental value indicators: past long-term returns, book-to-market equity ratio, cash flows-to-price ratio and earnings to-price ratio. Using ex post returns as a proxy for expected returns and analyst coverage as a proxy for the rate of information diffusion, I show that contrarian portfolio returns decline monotonically with increasing rates of information diffusion. The conclusions remain the same after reasonably accounting for risk as proxied by the four-factor model. These results are consistent with predictions of Hong and Stein (1999) model and are robust to the time period and data samples used.
In addition to the main observation above, I also show that analyst coverage is more important among glamour than value stocks, supporting the view that investors are more prone to decision biases when it comes to pricing hard-to-value glamour stocks for which information is relatively more ambiguous. This evidence is consistent with Daniel et al. (1998) who argue that the return predictability should be stronger in firms with greater uncertainty.
Overall, the results presented in this article give credence to the idea that expectational errors may play a role in the way investors set security prices.
